As I blogged Wednesday, Pacira Biosciences, Inc. is suing over allegedly “false and misleading statements made about EXPAREL, a pain medication drug,” in articles in the medical journal Anesthesiology (and related materials). It’s asking the court to “order Defendants to remove the challenged statements from its website, print a retraction in the next issue of Anesthesiology, and prohibit the individual defendants from publishing or
circulating the challenged materials, pending resolution of this suit.” (The brief arguing for this preliminary injunction, which was sealed when I first blogged about it, is now available, in lightly redacted form.)
But preliminary injunctions against libel (entered before a trial) are generally viewed as unconstitutional prior restraints, even by courts that generally allow permanent injunctions against repeating material found to be libelous at trial. And though this is a trade libel case, trade libel claims (at least ones not involving commercial advertising) are subject to the same First Amendment rules as ordinary libel claims.
In the words of the California Supreme Court in Balboa Village Island Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, the most influential recent decision allowing permanent injunctions against libel,
In determining whether an injunction restraining defamation may be issued, … it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief prior to trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially determined to be defamatory…. “… The attempt to enjoin the initial distribution of a defamatory matter meets several barriers, the most impervious being the constitutional prohibitions against prior restraints on free speech and press …. In contrast, an injunction against continued distribution of a publication which a jury has determined to be defamatory may be more readily granted….”
Likewise, when the Kentucky Supreme Court authorized permanent injunctions against libel, it expressly rejected preliminary injunctions:
[T]he speech alleged to be false and defamatory by the Respondents has not been finally adjudicated to be, in fact, false. Only upon such a determination could the speech be ascertained to be constitutionally unprotected, and therefore subject to injunction against future repetition. We are mindful that the rule announced herein delays the availability of injunctive relief during the time it takes to litigate the issue. Thus, while the rule may temporarily delay relief for those ultimately found to be innocent victims of slander and libel, it prevents the unwarranted suppression of speech of those who are ultimately shown to have committed no defamation, and thereby protects important constitutional values.
The Nebraska Supreme Court took the same view:
A jury has yet to determine whether Sullivan’s allegations about Dillon and his business practices are false or misleading representations of fact. For these reasons, we conclude that the temporary restraining order, as well as the permanent injunction restraining Sullivan’s speech, constitute unconstitutional prior restraints in derogation of Sullivan’s right to speak.
Or in the words of the Alaska Supreme Court, “Preliminary injunctions are almost always held to be unconstitutional burdens on speech because they involve restraints on speech before the speech has been fully adjudged to not be constitutionally protected.” And while the court went on to say that, “A preliminary injunction barring speech may be permissible only if the trial court has fully adjudicated and determined that the affected speech is not constitutionally protected,” the injunction that it was authorizing this way isn’t really so preliminary.[1] The few cases that have upheld preliminary injunctions against libel have not squarely responded to this criticism.[2]
And the Third Circuit, in which this case is being litigated, seems to take a similar view; it has endorsed permanent injunctions against libel, but precisely because they are entered after a trial (emphasis in first paragraph in original, in second paragraph added):
Two of the three traditional reasons for barring equity from enjoining a defamation … are obviated once a jury has determined that the enjoined statements are indeed libelous. First, it obviously cannot be said that a defendant has been denied the right to a jury determination of the veracity of his statements if a judge issues an injunction against further statements after a jury has determined that the same statements are untrue and libelous.
Second, not all injunctions against speech constitute prior restraints. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that an injunction against speech generally will not be considered an unconstitutional prior restraint if it is issued after a jury has determined that the speech is not constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) (“The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.“). Because libelous speech is not protected by either the United States or the Pennsylvania Constitutions, it follows that, once a jury has determined that a certain statement is libelous, it is not a prior restraint for the court to enjoin the defendant from repeating that statement.
I was curious how the brief supporting the injunction would overcome these objections, but the answer is that it doesn’t: It doesn’t seem to mention the First Amendment or prior restraints. Presumably they are saving that for the reply brief; when that is filed, I’ll post something about whatever argument they make.
I also don’t know of any authority for ordering a journal to print a retraction before trial; indeed, it’s controversial whether even it’s permissible to order a retraction even after material is found libelous at trial. I hope the reply brief will likewise elaborate on this.
[* * *]
[1] See also Mishler v. MAC Systems, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 98–99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (condemning a preliminary injunction issued “after only the most preliminary of determinations by the trial court”); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1223–24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (dissolving a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, because speech cannot be restricted “before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment”); Hartman v. PIP-Group, LLC, __ S.E.2d __ (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (“We have found no Georgia case upholding an interlocutory injunction prohibiting speech. Our Supreme Court has noted that although ‘it has never been held that all injunctions against publication are impermissible,’ such an injunction has been upheld only when it ‘was entered subsequent to a verdict in which a jury found that statements made by [the defendant] were false and defamatory.'”); Anagnost v. Mortgage Specialists, Inc., 2016 WL 10920366, *3 (N.H. Super. Ct.) (“[B]y asking for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin Gill from making statements that have not yet been found to be unprotected.”); Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“A preliminary injunction is a prior restraint.”); Cohen v. Advanced Med. Group, 496 S.E.2d 710, 710-11 (Ga. 1998) (overturning a preliminary injunction against libel on the grounds that the injunction was not “‘entered subsequent to a verdict in which a jury found that statements made by [defendant] were false and defamatory'” (quoting High Country Fashions, Inc. v. Marlenne Fashions, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. 1987))); Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (stressing that an injunction of charitable solicitation was permitted only “after a final adjudication on the merits that the speech is unprotected”).
[2] But see Gillespie v. Council, 2016 WL 5616589, *3 (Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 27) (reluctantly allowing preliminary injunction in libel case, because a 1974 Nevada Supreme Court had allowed such injunctions); San Antonio Community Hosp. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1233–39 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a preliminary injunction in a labor union libel case was not a prior restraint because the statements were so misleading as to be fraudulent, and “[t]he First Amendment does not protect fraud”); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158-59 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (ordering a preliminary injunction against a libel on a matter of private concern, concluding that the libel was constitutionally unprotected but not considering the prior restraint problem); Parland v. Millennium Const. Servs., LLC, 623 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing a preliminary injunction so long as there is a showing of irreparable harm); Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing preliminary injunction as to speech on matters of “primarily private concern”).
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